Temporal incompatibilities: Substantivalism, A-passage, and physical phenomena
In this thesis I attempt to make evident an incompatibility between temporal substantivalism and two other theses: (i) that time passes in a purely A-theoretical sense, and (ii) that time's directionality depends on an asymmetry in one or another physical phenomena. Toward this end, Chapter One, first describes the important relationship between states of affairs and times, then details the necessary conditions of a robustly substantivalist account of time. In Chapter Two, I specify a common A-theoretical sense of temporal passage that treats temporal properties as intrinsic properties of states of affairs and I argue that this notion of passage is incompatible with the substantivalist thesis laid out in the first chapter. Finally, in Chapter Three, I recapitulate several attempts to ground time's directionality on an asymmetry in certain physical phenomena. I ultimately argue that all accounts of time's directionality appealing to physical phenomena also fail to cohere with Chapter One's substantivalist thesis, but that some causal accounts of time's asymmetry (accounts which govern all physical phenomena) cohere quite nicely with temporal substantivalism.