Abstract/Details

Modeling Superfund: A hazardous waste bargaining model with rational threats


2000 2000

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Abstract (summary)

This dissertation takes a retrospective look at the first decade of EPA's implementation of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act commonly known as Superfund. Two models are employed that reflect EPA's implementation of Superfund: a rational threats game-theoretic bargaining model and a discrete choice empirical model. The game theoretic hazardous waste bargaining model produces an elegant and simple decision rule. Using this decision rule, EPA compares the expected transaction costs incurred because of litigation against EPA's prospects for a court-ordered award. The agency enters into bargaining when the savings from avoiding litigation is equal to the court-ordered award. EPA and the coalition of responsible parties bargain about how to share site clean-up costs (mixed funding) and when successful, enter into a voluntary settlement. The discrete choice empirical analysis reveals that high transaction costs, lengthy delays in site clean-ups and limited enforcement/litigation characterize EPAs implementation of CERCLA during the decade ending in 1990. Differences in how EPA implements this legislation across EPA Regions is explored. Compared to the other Eastern EPA Regions, EPA Region 4 is less likely to litigate and more likely to use Superfund monies to clean up hazardous waste sites.

Indexing (details)


Subject
Agricultural economics;
Environmental science;
Economics;
Bargaining;
Models;
Environmental cleanup;
Studies
Classification
0503: Agricultural economics
0768: Environmental science
0501: Economics
Identifier / keyword
Health and environmental sciences; Social sciences; Bargaining; Game theory; Hazardous waste; Rational threats; Superfund
Title
Modeling Superfund: A hazardous waste bargaining model with rational threats
Author
Taft, Mary Anderson
Number of pages
108
Publication year
2000
Degree date
2000
School code
0118
Source
DAI-A 61/10, Dissertation Abstracts International
Place of publication
Ann Arbor
Country of publication
United States
ISBN
9780599963702, 0599963700
Advisor
Field, Barry
University/institution
University of Massachusetts Amherst
University location
United States -- Massachusetts
Degree
Ph.D.
Source type
Dissertations & Theses
Language
English
Document type
Dissertation/Thesis
Dissertation/thesis number
9988845
ProQuest document ID
304605076
Copyright
Database copyright ProQuest LLC; ProQuest does not claim copyright in the individual underlying works.
Document URL
http://search.proquest.com/docview/304605076
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