Abstract/Details

The influence of subnational interests in supranational regulation


2008 2008

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Abstract (summary)

This dissertation assesses the influence of subnational interest in the supranational regulatory process. It draws on the experience of the European Union (EU) as an advanced model of supranational governance. To increase democratic input in rulemaking, the EU created in 1994 an advisory body—the Committee of the Regions, consisting of officials with electoral mandates at local or regional levels. This research is the first systematic test of the influence of this body. The study tracks 60 legislative proposals initiated by the European Commission between 1996 and 2007 and estimates the change made in response to the requests of the decentralized interest. Specifically, two questions are addressed: (1) how often the preferences expressed in the Committee's opinion are acted upon through incorporation into EU legislation, and (2) under what conditions the likelihood for incorporation is maximized.

The analysis is done at two levels: it first investigates the factors affecting the success of individual amendments proposed by the Committee, and then moves to the proposal level to assess the influence on aggregate legislative outcomes. The study utilizes rigorous statistical analyses, including ordered probit estimation, generalized linear model, and negative binomial model. To check the robustness of the results, a bootstrapping procedure is performed. The empirical estimates of the coefficients confirmed the results obtained under the theoretical distributional assumptions.

The analysis demonstrates that the Commission responds favorably more than one third of the time. The opinion of the Committee is more influential on proposals dealing with regional and cohesion policy, where it has an informational advantage. Consistent with the notion of bureaucratic expertise, the responsiveness of the Commission is contingent upon the complexity of the policy issue at hand. Finally, the elected subnational politicians are more likely to be heard by the non-elected Commission if the public is dissatisfied with the democratic process in the European Union.

The broader societal value of this work lies in its focus on the fundamental question of how to reconcile bureaucracy and democracy.

Indexing (details)


Subject
International law;
Public administration;
Regulation;
Democracy;
Bureaucracy
Company
European Union
Classification
0616: International law
0617: Public administration
Identifier / keyword
Social sciences; Committee of the Regions; European Union; Subnational interests; Supranational regulation
Title
The influence of subnational interests in supranational regulation
Author
Neshkova, Milena Ivanova
Number of pages
212
Publication year
2008
Degree date
2008
School code
0093
Source
DAI-A 69/11, Dissertation Abstracts International
Place of publication
Ann Arbor
Country of publication
United States
ISBN
9780549890843
Advisor
Ringquist, Evan J.
Committee member
Audretsch, David B.; Perry, James L.; Sissenich, Beate
University/institution
Indiana University
Department
Public Affairs
University location
United States -- Indiana
Degree
Ph.D.
Source type
Dissertations & Theses
Language
English
Document type
Dissertation/Thesis
Dissertation/thesis number
3331261
ProQuest document ID
304632929
Copyright
Database copyright ProQuest LLC; ProQuest does not claim copyright in the individual underlying works.
Document URL
http://search.proquest.com/docview/304632929
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