Abstract/Details

Being good, doing right, faring well


2009 2009

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Abstract (summary)

In this dissertation, I use virtue theory to answer a number of different questions in the normative ethics of behavior and in welfare axiology.

In chapter 1, I provide an introduction to the Normative Ethics of Behavior. I present some of the conceptual background necessary for answering the question “What makes right actions right?” In chapter 2, I provide critical summaries of some of the most popular virtue-ethical theories of right action. In chapter 3, I present and defend my own virtue-ethical theory of right action and show why this rather simple theory is not vulnerable to any of the objections that challenge its virtue-ethical rivals.

In chapter 4, I turn to the question of how to measure the extent to which a person acts justly in the performance of an action. I argue that there are at least four variables that determine how just a person’s action is at a time. I try to show how we can integrate these four variables into a single measure for just action.

In chapter 5, I consider whether being just is intrinsically, prudentially rewarding. Most modern philosophers answer: no, at least not as a matter of necessity. In a recent and influential paper, Wayne Sumner disagrees with this popular position. I rehearse and criticize his arguments. In chapter 6, I offer a new argument for Sumner’s conclusion, one that avoids the problems that his own argument faces. My argument turns on the fact that a just person’s own moral virtue will make a distributional claim on her that she is bound to satisfy in a way that will enhance her welfare.

Indexing (details)


Subject
Philosophy
Classification
0422: Philosophy
Identifier / keyword
Philosophy, religion and theology; Desert; Justice; Measurement; Moral virtue; Right action; Well-being
Title
Being good, doing right, faring well
Author
Doviak, Daniel
Number of pages
214
Publication year
2009
Degree date
2009
School code
0118
Source
DAI-A 70/06, Dissertation Abstracts International
Place of publication
Ann Arbor
Country of publication
United States
ISBN
9781109189919
Advisor
Feldman, Fred
University/institution
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Department
Philosophy
University location
United States -- Massachusetts
Degree
Ph.D.
Source type
Dissertations & Theses
Language
English
Document type
Dissertation/Thesis
Dissertation/thesis number
3359134
ProQuest document ID
304923976
Copyright
Database copyright ProQuest LLC; ProQuest does not claim copyright in the individual underlying works.
Document URL
http://search.proquest.com/docview/304923976
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