Done deal: Socially expected and contested duration in the corporate merger and acquisition market
This dissertation examines the relationship between social structure and the average length of time in economic exchange. The corporate merger and acquisition market is examined over a 19 year period to study the statistical relationship between the average length of time in deal negotiations and measures of institutional forces as well as established sociometric measures. Survival regression modeling is employed to assess the role social structure plays in the length of time in deal making. At the actor level, network position among investment bankers plays a role in the average length of time in deal negotiations. Investment bankers use degree centrality and exploit structural holes within their ego networks to further their duration goals. At the group level, properties of the overall network of investment bankers are related to the average length of time in deal negotiations as well. Network density of the investment bank community is related to the average length of time in deal making. Institutional forces play a role in the average length of time in negotiations as well. Measures of coercive, normative, as well as mimetic institutional forces are statistically related to the average length of time in deal negotiations. The passage of time itself is statistically related to lengthening the remaining length of time, on average, in deal negotiations.