Abstract/Details

Uncertainty, risk aversion and optimal licensing mechanisms


2005 2005

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Abstract (summary)

This research analyzes optimal licensing mechanisms in an environment characterized by uncertainty and risk aversion. We develop a licensing model with an upstream licensor and downstream licensees where the downstream players are characterized by differential attitudes towards risk. We find that the licensor chooses to license a drastic innovation to both parties if demand uncertainty is high and the potential licensees are not too dissimilar in their attitudes towards risk.

Indexing (details)


Subject
Economic theory;
Licensing;
Risk aversion;
Models;
Innovations;
Studies
Classification
0511: Economic theory
Identifier / keyword
Social sciences; Licensing; Optimal licensing; Risk aversion; Uncertainty
Title
Uncertainty, risk aversion and optimal licensing mechanisms
Author
Chatterjee, Priyabroto
Number of pages
91
Publication year
2005
Degree date
2005
School code
0183
Source
DAI-A 66/10, Dissertation Abstracts International
Place of publication
Ann Arbor
Country of publication
United States
ISBN
9780542348297, 0542348292
Advisor
Kovenock, Daniel J.
University/institution
Purdue University
University location
United States -- Indiana
Degree
Ph.D.
Source type
Dissertations & Theses
Language
English
Document type
Dissertation/Thesis
Dissertation/thesis number
3191437
ProQuest document ID
305388379
Copyright
Database copyright ProQuest LLC; ProQuest does not claim copyright in the individual underlying works.
Document URL
http://search.proquest.com/docview/305388379
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