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This article explores the determinants of political decentralization in OECD parliamentary systems.1 Existing literature on the determinants of decentralization is primarily focused on fiscal reform (Willis et al , 1999; Rodden, 2000; Wibbels, 2006). Less attention is given to political decentralization, which is an institutional reform that establishes new subnational legislatures and executives. Creating additional levels of government may have implications for economic performance, ethnic conflict and public sector innovation (Strumpf, 2002; Brancati, 2006; Treisman, 2007). Given the scope of these consequences, it is important to determine when and why governments enact political decentralization. However, few works exist on the determinants of political decentralization, especially in parliamentary systems; extant literature is primarily grounded in Latin American presidential systems (Escobar-Lemmon, 2003; O'Neill, 2003).
Theories on the determinants of political decentralization consider the strategic motive of political actors to be the driving determinant (Falleti, 2005; Benoit, 2007). Motive is typically associated with the desire to remain in office or government. The motive to decentralize is thus shaped by shifting political contexts, in which a party chooses decentralization based on the potential political ramifications. This article explores how the motive and ability to enact political decentralization emerge from the composition and characteristics of parliamentary governments. Parliamentary governments often reflect various membership and policy configurations. To enact political reform, governments must reach agreement and pursue strategies amidst a number of potential partisan arrangements. Under certain configurations, governments (and the parties of which they are constructed) face political incentives that increase the probability of political reform.
The link between the partisan composition of government and public policy has been explored elsewhere, but the literature has largely excluded the policy of decentralization (Schmidt, 1996; Imbeau et al , 2001). I hypothesize that four government composition characteristics may affect the probability of political decentralization: ideology, party decentralization platforms, government power and stability, and the presence of ethnoregionalist parties. Political ideologies are often attributed to partisan support and opposition for the role and power of central government, but the ideological connection with decentralization reform has not received explicit attention in cross-national research and its influence remains uncertain. Another factor related to ideological beliefs is party policy platforms. Parties often publish policy platforms for or against the decentralization of government, which may...