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Japan's response to the global HIV/AIDS crisis in the 1980s was lukewarm, due mainly to the absence of a domestic perception of AIDS as an immediate threat. The key determinants of that perception were rare cases of AIDS infections in Japan, a detrimental media role, and weak civil society. Japanese media contributed to shaping a flawed image of AIDS as a foreign disease or a disease of homosexuality and promiscuity. Moreover, civil society organizations were not strong enough to create momentum for reformulating the distorted perception or catalyzing specific policies. Not until the early 1990s did Japan's global AIDS funding increase. The policy shift was in tandem with the rising influence of newly emerged civil activist groups. KEYWORDS: HIV/AIDS, Japan's foreign aid policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, media, civil society.
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE (DAC) MEMBERS IN THE Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development commenced global funding to fight human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. But they varied in terms of their financial commitment. Some countries, like the United States and Sweden, dramatically increased assistance. Others, like Japan, seemed unwilling at first to join the global fight against AIDS. Still others, like France and Germany, placed themselves in the middle with incremental funding increases. Regardless, I argue that the DAC countries converged in the policy choice to provide aid under the pressure of international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), whose role was to develop and diffuse international norms regarding HIV/AIDS (Kim 2014).1
The WHO was instrumental in developing and disseminating the idea that the HIV/AIDS pandemic was an urgent international problem that required the international community to act cooperatively. The WHO taught major donors about appropriate behavior in response to the threat by reminding them of the meaning of DAC membership and the associated sense of obligation. This normative framework shaped the motivations of the main donor countries to initiate foreign-aid programs for the global health agenda (Mann 1987; Mann and Kay 1991; Will 1991; Slutkin 2000; Merson 2006).
What, then, caused variations in the aid policies of the DAC countries? I claim that each country's policy depended on how it framed and understood the pandemic for its domestic audience. A policy commitment is more likely...