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Introduction
Whatever else the parties in the human-enhancement debate disagree about, they share the conviction that there is something morally salient about human enhancement technologies (HET) in general. 'Transhumanists' argue that HET should be promoted; 'bioconservatives' maintain that they should be curtailed or at least approached with caution. This essay examines this shared presupposition by analysing the (technological) means used for human enhancement. We argue that neither party in the debate offers a clear analysis of what moral issues are exclusively or especially raised by HET as opposed to other technologies or to non-technological enhancement methods: both parties appeal to implicit and unsustainable views about human nature or about technology in general. This has, rightly, raised doubts that anything informative can be said about the moral acceptability of human enhancement.
We propose an alternative, more fine-grained approach. To identify what is morally salient about enhancement technologies, we start from an explicit, minimalist conception of human agents as bounded practical reasoners and of technology as instruments. This conception allows us to categorise different effects of technologies on our possibilities for action and our evaluation of these possibilities. For each effect that HET can have, we discuss whether it is morally salient and whether it can also be brought about by non-enhancement technologies. We conclude that HET are morally salient in several respects, that not all HET share all those morally salient respects, and that continuities with traditional technologies may be found in all morally salient respects.
The nature of the debate
HET are often loosely specified as technologies that enhance human capacities past their normal level. Commonly used examples are gene therapy, brain implants and smart drugs. The controversy surrounding HET rages on in the popular and academic press. Yet it turns out to be surprisingly difficult to determine what is specifically morally salient about these technologies.
Bioconservatives like Kass 1 argue against enhancement technologies by claiming that there is something intrinsically valuable about human nature that will be lost once we enhance ourselves. By enhancing our natural capacities, we may become 'better', but not necessarily 'better humans'. Leaving aside the problem with spelling out the 'intrinsic value' appealed to (eg, see Fukuyama 2 ), the strength of this argument cannot be judged independently of the...