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One of the lingering mysteries of the Cold War is the 15 April 1969 North Korean shoot-down of a U.S. Navy EC-121M aircraft from Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One (VQ-1) 90 miles off North Korea's shores. This unusual incident was costly in terms of lives (31), budget (Commander, Seventh Fleet, assembled a four-carrier task force in the Sea of Japan), and diplomacy (no retaliation-not even a U.S. request for reparations). By testing newly elected President Richard Nixon, Pyongyang took considerable risks for what would appear to be little gain. The North Koreans certainly never apologized.
The Decision to Fly
Questions concerning how or precisely why Pyongyang decided to down the EC-121 remain unanswered. In all likelihood, it was to accelerate a campaign to reunify North and South Korea and probably stemmed from a power struggle that some have characterized as the "rise of the partisan generals." These developments led to instability on the Korean Peninsula, and this period-so violent as to be called the "second Korean War"-fostered a willingness to challenge the United States by unconventional measures.1
Two factors could have influenced the timing. First, the partisan generals needed to do something soon, in view of their resounding lack of success in encouraging reunification throughout most of 1968. More immediately, Kim 11 Sung's impending birthday on 15 April could have had some bearing. Given the level of cultural emphasis and press treatment this anniversary received, it would not have been surprising had the military conducted the shootdown as a birthday gift to him.2
This was the backdrop for VQ-l's ill-fated mission. The United States had been flying signals intelligence flights over the Sea of Japan since 1950, and it was risky business. On 28 April 1965, two MiG-17s attacked a U.S. Air Force RB-47, flying 35-40 miles off the North Korean coast, and the damaged RB-47 was forced to make an emergency landing in Japan. The next four years were relatively uneventful, although North Korea scrambled fighters routinely in response to U.S. aerial reconnaissance missions.3
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) again had reviewed reconnaissance policies against North Korea following its seizure of the intelligence collector USS Pueblo (AGER-2) in January 1968 and revised criteria for evaluation of mission risk.' Operationally, the Commander-inChief, Pacific Fleet...