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The institutional and intellectual factors that led to the development of amphibious doctrine are of greater importance than the doctrine itself.
The Marine Corps, for over 50 years, has devoted the bulk of its training, organization, and doctrinal thought to developing and improving the techniques of amphibious warfare. The Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, published in 1934, established the first clearly defined amphibious doctrine and continues to be the foundation of Marine tactics. Throughout World War II, the tenets in the manual were tested in combat and revised. In the postwar decades, new technology, embodied in helicopters and improved landing vehicles, has further modified amphibious doctrine. Yet, the basic tactics established in 1934 remain substantially unchanged.
The Tentative Manual for Landing Operations is a memorial to a relatively small group of Marine officers who, during the decades prior to World War II, dealt with and overcame complex doctrinal problems. Despite budget cuts, widespread disagreements both inside and outside the Corps over proper missions, and even threatened dissolution of the Corps itself, these officers developed a sound, efficient tactical doctrine. More importantly, they developed a process by which doctrine could be formulated and tested. This article will analyze this process. If the essential elements that enabled the Marine Corps to perfect amphibious doctrine in the interwar years can be identified, they may provide guidance to Marines faced with adjusting present day doctrine to the relentless demands of ever-changing technology and shifting missions.
Marines returning home from World War I faced many of the same dilemmas encountered by their grandsons 55 years later. New technology and concepts of modern war, thrust upon them on the Western Front, had drastically altered prewar perceptions. Tactics learned in the remote Latin American countryside during the years from 1912 to 1916 had proven ineffective against the well-equipped and well-trained German Army. Even the recently developed Advanced Base Force, with its primarily defensive mission, seemed inadequate in the context of new global strategies. Marine officers, caught between their traditional naval heritage and the experiences of modern land warfare, felt out of step with both.
Marine tactical doctrine in 1920, or what existed of a doctrine, reflected the amorphous nature of the Corps' recent past. Much of the doctrine rested on...