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THE FRENCH are undoubtedly not alone among Europeans in their difficulty grasping American policy in the Middle East. Although clear in its objectives- -at least those publicly defined--it invariably raises questions and sometimes suspicions. Part of the problem comes from cultural differences. The French, without necessarily being cynical, tend to be skeptical of the moralism that America traditionally attaches to its policies. General Charles de Gaulle raised no eyebrows in France when he declared, as a self-evident truth, that the primary purpose of the state, which he characterized as a "cold monster," was to defend the nation's interests. Nor did anyone take offense when he set down the rule--still observed--that France recognizes only states, and that the regime governing a state is not its concern. (One might note in passing that observance of this principle has spared France not only the diplomatic complications accompanying changes in regimes but, paradoxically, accusations of hypocrisy and double standards.) The notion that there are rogue states, then, has no equivalent in the French political vocabulary and continues to be a source of puzzlement. In European eyes, Washington's criteria for categorizing good and bad states would, if applied rigorously, significantly lengthen the list of the latter. Strangely, the guilty parties are almost all relatively small Middle East countries. Nor are these states, accused of similar human rights violations and threats to international security, treated similarly. Syria, to cite the most recent case, was honored with a visit from the president of the United States even as it continues to grace the list of "terrorist states," harbors organizations that subvert friendly countries such as Israel and Turkey, and constitutes a dominant and contested presence in a neighboring country.
The logic of the "dual containment" policy, however elegantly articulated by Anthony Lake of the National Security Council in the March/April 1984 issue of Foreign Affairs (which also carried a spirited refutation by F. Gregory Gause III), seems irrational. "Dual containment," Lake writes, "does not mean duplicate containment. The basic purpose is to counter the hostility of both Baghdad and Teheran, but the challenges posed by the two regimes are distinct and therefore require tailored approaches."
In a September 1994 speech, CIA director James Woolsey declared: "The record since [the Islamic revolution in]...