Content area
Full Text
Email: pengwang@hku.hk (corresponding author)
From 1993, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) merged the Ministry of Supervision with the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), until early 2018, China's anti-corruption system was characterized by the coexistence of two major institutions: the disciplinary inspection system (CDI) and the anti-corruption force of the People's Procuratorate.1 To strengthen the Party's control over anti-corruption work, the CCP decided to establish the National Supervisory Commission by integrating the anti-corruption force of the People's Procuratorate with the disciplinary inspection system. Before a national rollout, the Party conducted pilot programmes in Beijing, Shanxi province and Zhejiang province. In March 2018, the first session of the 13th National People's Congress approved the draft National Supervision Law, and supervisory commissions were established by the People's Congress at all levels across the whole country in the first half of 2018. This dramatic institutional reform is a significant step towards the institutionalization of China's anti-corruption drive.
How does the creation of the National Supervisory Commission affect China's capacity to curb corruption? This article addresses this question by comparing the previous dual-track anti-corruption system with the new, consolidated anti-corruption agency.2 First, it examines China's previous anti-corruption system by focusing on four dimensions of the interaction between the CDI and the anti-corruption force of the procuratorate: complementarity, convergence, competition and conflict. Under the Party's leadership, the CDI and the procuratorate complemented each other and worked together to curb corruption. Procurators, who investigate cases by following state laws and due process, were frequently invited to join corruption investigations led by CDI officers, who were committed to upholding Party rules. This collaboration led to a convergence of rules and standards between their institutions, thereby promoting the rule of law within the CDI and strengthening political awareness in the procuratorate. However, this dual-track anti-corruption system was not perfect. Competition and conflict between the CDI and the procuratorate were daily occurrences as each institution adhered to different rules (one was to enforce Party rules; the other to uphold legal principles). Furthermore, the interests of anti-corruption agencies tended to make stakeholders within such a system self-serving. Divergent interests, rules and objectives had a negative impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the dual-track anti-corruption system.
By merging with the anti-corruption force...