Unfair trade practices and safeguard actions

As the world economy is now facing structural changes and recession unprecedented since the 1930s, trade protectionism has begun to re-emerge. Tariff trade barriers, after several rounds of GATT negotiation, are no longer a serious concern. Rather, it is the use of non-tariff trade barriers that threatens the world trading order. This thesis examines the legal problems involved in the use of the most commonly employed non-tariff trade barriers. The concentration is on dumping/ antidumping, subsidy/ anti subsidy, emergency safeguard actions against imports, voluntary export restraints (VERs), and Multifiber Arrangements (MFA). Dumping and subsidy are commonly termed as unfair trade practices, although the element of unfairness in these practices is subject to much controversy. The emergency safeguard regimes under Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), VERs, and the MFA present various modes of safeguard actions. The thesis comprises three parts. Part One investigates the current state of world economy. Chapter I examines the impacts of structural changes and recession on the functions of three main international economic organizations, the GATT, the International Monetary Funds, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Chapter II looks into the classic free trade theory and the emergence of new sources of comparative advantages. Emphasis is on how the changing pattern of comparative advantage affect the world economy and trading relations. Current trade conflicts and their solutions are discussed in Chapter III with special emphasis on the various use of non-tariff trade barriers. Part Two, the main part of the thesis, concentrates on the legal analysis of those issues mentioned above. International law, mainly the GATT, as well as national implementing legislation and actual practices is investigated. Economic analysis is used to facilitate legal discussions. Part Three, the concluding part of the thesis, has two chapters. Chapter I examines how politics in the time of economic hardship affects the making and application of trade laws, and how far the current legal regimes regarding unfair trade practices and safeguard actions depart from the goal of global efficiency. Chapter II, in an attempt to search for the least distortive and politically viable way to improve the current legal order in international trade, discusses and comments on specific proposals made by Professor Barcelo of the Cornell University, Professor Lowenfeld of the New York University, and Dr. Hindley of the London School of Economics. Finally, the candidate puts forwards her own proposal.