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ABSTRACT: In response to the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen in 2015, the Houthis transformed quickly from a local insurgent group to a nonstate actor able to defy regional powers. The Houthis' ability to lay the foundation for a nascent strategy of compellence provides important lessons on the growing accessibility and affordability of sophisticated weapons' systems and the likelihood future violent extremist groups will opt for this military posture as well.
Since the beginning of the war in Yemen in March 2015, Ansar Allah (commonly known as the Houthis) have been using missiles and drones against military targets belonging to the Saudi-led coalition. The Houthis have also attacked civilian targets deep inside Saudi Arabia and possibly inside the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The frequency of these attacks has become a common feature of the conflict-in 2018, the Houthis reportedly launched one missile attack nearly every week.1 In this context, this article considers the evolution of the Houthi way of war from its first insurgency campaigns in 2004-11 to the ongoing conflict. It then assesses how the Houthis have built an effective strategy of compellence against conventional armed forces using missiles and drones, one explicitly inspired by Hezbollah's strategy in south Lebanon during the 1992-2000 period. This article concludes with some implications of this emerging pattern of nonstate actor warfare.
Missile attacks are obviously not the only tactics employed by the Houthis. Since the war started in 2015, the group has launched numerous ground offensives and, in particular, raids at the Saudi Arabia border that sometimes led to spectacular results.2 Moreover, it can be argued the use of missiles and drones is nothing new and neither is its strategic significance, especially in the Middle East.3 During the Second Lebanon War (July 2006) Hezbollah in Lebanon was able to fire missiles at Israel for 34 days despite a massive air campaign conducted by the Israeli Air Force.4 Likewise, Hamas and other Palestinian groups have, over the past decade, moved away from suicide bombings and now use rockets as their primary means of attacking southern Israeli cities.
At the same time, the damages suffered by Saudi forces and some of the country's critical infrastructures (airports, oil fields) highlight the difficulties of defending civilian and military targets against these...